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Non-Professional Scuba Training Fatalities




From 1970 to 1976 'ninety seven fatalities occurred during scuba
diving training courses taught by nationally recognized scuba certi-
fication agencies. Data from these fatalities was gathered and ana-
lyzed at the University of Rhode Island's National Underwater Acci-
dent Data Center (NUADC) from September 1977 to June 1978.
NUADC has been in operation since 1969 gathering information on
underwater fatalities involving United States citizens. Funding for
the ongoing research has been provided by grants from various federal
agencies including, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), Untted States Coast Guard Underwater Safety Project Office,
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Since 1970,
NUADC has published annual reports linti tled United States Underwater
Fatality statistics (year). Data ~or underwater fatalities is sup-
plied from a variety of sources. 'Early in its history, NUADc relied
primarily on subscriptions to news clipping services which sent items
regardinljJ underwater accidents to NUADC, which in turn analyzed the
available information and conducted an investigation of the accident.
In more recent years as NUADC has become well known to both the diving
cODallunity and various federal agencies the primary source of data has
shifted to what are referred to as "ofticial sources." These sources
involve both agencies that gather accident data such as the Consumer
Product Safety Commission as well as investigative agencies such as
law enforcement and coroner offices.
Each accident at NUADC is transcribed into a computer coded for-
mat and stored on magnetic -mory discs in th U i i~ ~ ~ e n vers ty co~uter.
i
f1.' l e on each case which includes clippingsIn addition, there is a paper
and investigative reports.
In the course of the research for this paper, aaa fatalities were
reviewed from 1970 to 1976. From these 888 cases each case that in-
volved a formal training course for non-professional scuba divers was
noted. A formal training course is any scuba course taught by an in-
structor who is currently certified by a recognized certifying organ-
ization. These courses offer ratings from basic scuba diver to scuba
instructor, with various ratings in between. Course requirements vary
depending on the certifying agency. Over aD' of the training fatali-
ties were students enrolled in a basic course. Typical minimum re-
quirements for a basic course consist of approximately 30 hours of
instruction of which at least 9 hours must be open water training.
These fatalities were then investigated and data, which is reflected
in the statistical tables in this paper, was Obtained and analyzed.
The cases included several fatalities which involved students en-
gaged in water work that did not include the use of scuba gear.
For exa~le, a student instructor died while performing an endur-
ance swim in a pool. Thus, the statistics in this paper in some
instances do not exactly correspond to the data published in the
yearly underwater fatality reports, where training fatalities in-
clude only divers actually using scuba equipment.
After analysis of each case and compilation of data for the
statistical tables, an effort was made to look for specific trends
that occurred over the course of the period investigated. For example
more fatalities seem to be occurring in which a boat is used as the
diving platform and these dives tended to be to a greater depth than
corresponding dives made from the shore. The small statistical sample,
ii
however, dictates that caution should be exhibited when giving cre-
dence to any apparent trends.
In the course of analysis it became evident that a high percen-
tage of training fatalities occurred to students who were diving in
less than perfect environmental conditions. A strong relationship
appears to exist between high stress levels in the victims and cold
water.
Questionable decisions on the part of the instructors were evident
in approximately 10\ of the fatalities. These cases included ones in
which serious mistakes were made by the instructor. The figure could
be higher but sufficient data did not exist to substantiate this with-
out totally subjective analysis.
An effort was made throughout the paper to examine the statistics
as objectively as possible. Any deductions that were made have been
remarked upon in the body of the paper.
It is the hope of the author that a close scrutiny of this re-
port and the errors that have occurred in the past can aid in making




The formal instruction of recreational or sport diving in the united
states is a comparatively recent phenomenon, confined for the most part
to the period ~ollowing 1959. Recreational diving as a sport did not
become popular until the 1950's when the introduction of scuba (an
acronym for .!.elf £,ontained ~derwater ~reathing !pparatus) revolution-
ized the sport. Previous to the inuoduction of scuba equipment a
sport diver had two options. One was skin diving using only mask,
fins, and snorkel. The obvious drawback to skin diving was that a diver
could 8tay submerged only as long as he could hold his breath - in most
cases no longer than several minutes. The other option to a person
seeking underwater enjoyment was to purchase an air compressor and dive
using a surface supplied hose system. This setup was not inexpensive
and in addition, the diver had little mobility as he could go no farther
than the length of his air hose. A person who was interested in learninq to
scuba dive in the infant days of the sport could ei ther strap on a recent-
ly acquired set of tanks and regulator and engage in an exercise of self
instruction or rely upon a friend who had already made a number of dives
himself and was thus considered proficient enough to impart the required
knowledge. Not surprisingly, scuba instruction in the early days was
based totally on practical experience.
In the beginning there was limited concern about the numerous safety
considerations involved in scuba diving. This was due to a number of
reasons, the first of which was that the diver learning to scuba dive at
the time was more often than not already skilled in the art of skin diving
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and had a strong aquatic background. To progress to the use of scuba was
the logical next step if a diver wanted to advance his or her level of
skill and enjoyment of the underwater environment (the vast majority
of divers at this period were males). The prevalent feeling was that a
novice scuba diver already had the prerequisite aquatic experience which
made them aware of the inherent dangers of the sport. Another reason for
the lack of standardized scuba instruction was the tendency for divers to
affiliate themselves with a diving club. Affiliation with a diving club
had various benefits such as; increased diving opportunities with experienced
divers, instruction by divers who were considered proficient enough to teach
novice divers and use of club equipment which lowered the initial cost of
participating in the sport.
Inevitably scuba diving became an increasingly popular form of recrea-
tion and began to appeal to a larger segment of the popula~ion. As the
sport acquired new popularity in the early 1960s, it soon became apparent
that training was essential and some form of standardized training desir-
able. Standardized scuba instruction in the United States lagged consid-
erably behind other countries (most notably, Great Britain and France where
the sport actually beqan). In countries where sport diving had become
popular by this time a single nationwide certification associat&on had
been set up. But this was not the case in the U.S. where the first attempts
at formal certification began in the late 19508.
Some early scuba certification courses consisted of approximately
twelve hours of instruction. This instruction ellphasized physical condi-
tioning (usually acquired by swimming laps in a pool) and the memoriza-
tion of various facts about the effects of changes in atmospheric pressure
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on a diver's physiology. Instructor certification at this time was.
somewhat flexible process in certain cases. One procedure was for an ex-
perienced diver to prove to a certifying agency that he was qualified and
if the agency was convinced the diver was certified as an instructor.
In the early 1960s the instructional aspects of scuba diving began
a marked change. As the sport entered a period of rapid expansion, efforts
were made to convince prospective scuba divers that scuba lessons taught
by one of several recognized certifying agencies were necessary for the pro-
spective diver's safe enjoyment of the sport. Such a course resulted in the
issuance of a certification -. "c" card upon successful cozapletion. The first
certification carcis were issued by Los Angeles County in 1955. The first in-
structional agency to certify divers was the Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion (YMCA) in 1959. Other instructional agencies were soon formed to satis-
fy the growing demand of the sport. These agencies and the dates they were
founded are: National A8slix:iation of Scuba Diving Schools (NASDS) - 1960,
National Association of Underwater Instructors (NAUI) - 1960, Professional
Association of Diving Instructors (PADI) - 1968 and Scuba Schools Interna-
tional (551) -1970. The typical curriculum which leads to certification
as a basic scuba diver has changed considerably in the last fifteen years.
The length of the basic certification courses has increased from 12 to 32
hours of instruction. In addition where the early scuba courses required
no open water dives (conducted in a natural environment i.e. ocean, lake,
or river) the current standards require a minilllUlR of three open water dives
and strongly encourage instructors to provide up to five open water ex-
periences. Concurrently with the rise !It the number of hours in the stu-
dent courses precise standards and courses for instructors are now required
by all the certifying agencies. In order to be certified, prospective
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instructors must attend 200 hoWl's of ,tralniriqy- ciependinq on the certifying
agency, and meet certain prerequisites such as teaching a specified number
of courses in the capacity of assistant instructor. Annual recertification
of instructors is another added means of insuring quality control.
Scuba diving in the last 15 y~ars has experienced a massive growth rate.
From 1970-1974 alone the sport participation level increased over 200\.1
A large part of the participation increase in the sport in this time frame
has been due to technological advances in scuba diving equipment. In the
early days of the sport relativ'ly simple equipment provided sufficient
capabilities for the diver. Divers were required to depend more upon their
own physical abilities rather than relying upon the advanced technology of
the equipment. The instructors at this time concentrated on developing and
refining their student's swillllli.ng abil! ty, physical conditt,oninq and use of
emergency procedures in case of equipment,malfunction.
Such is not necessarily the case today. Students are now able to pur-
chase/ at no small expense, an impressive array of sport diving equipment.
Virtnally all of the new high technology equipment is aimed at making diving
a safer sport for a wider market-of consumers. Sophisticated buoyancy
compensators, Be. in diving jargon, have greatly simplified a diver's a-
bility to control his buoyancy. But simplicity is not necessarily inex-
pensive as they retail at prices up to $300. Another safety feature which is
used by many divers" especially instructors, is the additional second stage
regulator or octopus rig. Should a diver or his partner experience trouble
with their primary regulator or lose their air supply two divers can simul-
taneously breathe from one air supply with the use of an octopus arrange-
ment. The list goes on and on to include such "necessary" accessories as
light emitting diodes (LED), meters which measure the nitrogen saturation
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in a diver's body tissues.
As divers have become more equipment oriented, so have the philoso-
phies involved in their training. The emphasis now is on the use of as-
sorted mechanical devices to aid the diver in the event of an emergency
rather than the application of the diver's basic skills. 2 As divers could
increasingly depend on their equipment to substitute for basic requirements
such as good physical conditioning and previous aquatic experience the
sport broadened its appeal - attracting students for the most part who had
had limited exposure to the open water environment.
Diving has always maintained somewhat of a challenging or daredevil
mystique. Its initial appeal was to people who tOOk pride in the fact that
they were engaging in an activity which they perceived as beyond the capa-
bilities of the cOlllDOn man. While diving has expanded its appeal to include
all ages and sequent. of the society, the aura of hazard is still manifested
in the appeal of several aspects of the sport, most noticeably in such sport
diving activities as cave diving and the desire to make deep dives (dives
to a depth greater than the accepted maximum of 130 feet). Cave diving on
an annual basis from 1~70 to 1976 has accounted for an average of 14\ of the
total recreational scuba fatalities in the u.s. 3 Some sport divers equate
diving skill with the ability to make excessively deep dives. As diving
equipment has become more sophisticated the appeal of the sport is no longer
confined to people that are seeking to satisfy a psychological challenge.
New diving equipment has made the sport less physically demanding and has
removed the $tigma that diving is essentially a risky sport. 4
Thus, in the mid-nineteen sixties, recreational diving entered a
transitional phase culminating in a broader range of participants, those who
not only had more leisure time to devote to recreation but perceived diving
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as a relatively low cost recreational activity, well within their physical
capabilities. As a result, there came the need for increased instructional
opportunities and the subsequent formation of the certifying agencies that
now dominate the field.
The standards of instruction as stipulated by each of these agencies
are similar for the most part, however, there are some important differences.
An example is the depth at which training dives in open water are to be con-
ducted. PADl has dictated that basic courses conduct open water dives at
depths between 20 and 30 feet. NAUl thouqh did not adopt rigid depth guide-
lines until late 1972. Their instructor's manual requires that instructors
conduct all open water dives at depths between 20 and 40 feet. 5 With the ex-
ception of HASDS the major agencies require a minimum of three open water
experiences (HASDS requires four) consisting of "at least 9 hours of train-
ing in around or about open water. At least one hour of the open water train-
ing to be underwater on scuba.,,6 In addition to the open water instruction,
each basic student receives approxillUltely 24 hours of cla.sroom and pool
instruction. The final open water dive of the basic course is the final
checkout dive and following successful completion of this dive the student
receives a certification card. "c" cards are required in certain states
(i.e. California) before a diver can obtain refills for his air tank or
rent any scuba equipment. All the certifying agencies strongly encourage
dive shops not to sell air or rent any equipment to divers who do not possess
valid "C" cards.
The National Scuba Training Council (NSTC) was created in 1974. The
purpose of the NSTC, which was comprised of representatives from YMCA, NAUl,
PADI, and NASDS, was to create a body which would act as the ~presentative
group for scuba diving instruction in the united States. At the same meeting
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at which the four major training agencies voted to create the NSTC the agen-
cies agreed to comply with national standards which might be enacted in the
field of diving instruction, the criteria of which would be overseen by NSTC.
As the Director of PAD1 at the time stated, the move to create the NSTC was
not entirely void of external IDQtivation. "This IIDve was preceded by a
number of attempts by local goverrmaents to license and control diving on
the state level, with the misquided approach that there were no existing
standards or controls on diver training, and that this had led to an increase
in diving accidents.,,7 The issue of di'Ying legislation centered around a
Los Angeles County ordinance enacted in OCtober of 1974 which blposed rather
stringent require_nts on the industry (i.e. scuba divers had to be recerti-
fied every other year). 8 The impetus for the ordinance (according to the
certification aqencies) was a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times
purporting that "anyone can teach diving," and the "public is the victim
of unscrupulous commercial interests." The articles further stated that 22
deaths had occurred in the COunty this year. Large three inch front page
headlines proclailMd "SCUBA DEATHS" in a reporti~ fashion similar to the
outbreak of WOrld War 11. 9 After the series of articles in the L.A. Times
suffered certain credibility setbacks (some of the 22 reported deaths occur-
red in other counties and the victims in so_ c..es were actually cOlllllercial
divers - the actual number of L. A. County fatalities totaled 10 in 1974),
the certifying agencies united in an actempt to prevent "what was once a
simple sport from becoming a restrictive, bureaucratic process."IO
Although faced with an increase in fatalities from scuba diving in the
years immediately preceding 1974 the scuba certification agencies have
maintained that while scuba fatalities have indeed increased, (109 fatali-
ties in 1970 vs. 141 fatalities in 1974)11 the rise in these recreational
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-scuba fatalities when juxtaposed against the 200\ rise in diver participa-
tion in the sport over a corresponding period is relatively insignificant
and in fact, the statistics show that sc\lba diving has become a safer sport.
To further prove this contention that diving is a safer sport the agencies
have pointed out that the approximately one million divers that became par-
ticipants in the sport from 1950 to 1970 are still part of the population
base exposed to possible diving accidents. 12 There is no doubt some validity
to this argumen~, althouqh when' the training agencies are throwing statis-
tics back and forth there is a great deal of room for overlooking certain
realities in order to provide numbers which tend to support an already for~
ed conclusion. An example of this would be that the figure of one million
divers that became participants between 1950 and 1970 does not reflect the
percentage of divers that learned to dive and subsequently lost interest in
the sport and beCUlll!l what is known as "diving dropouts." Various articles
have indicated that anywhere from 45-90\ of all certified divers stop ac-
tively diving within one year of their final checkout dive. 13 The point
being made here is that there is no accurate way to measure diver partici-
pation, althouqh enouqh figures are offered to ther-;contrary. What can be
assumed (due to the fact that fatality statistics are a hiqhly accurate
figure) is that divinq is indeed a safer sport when measuring diver fatal i-
ties VB. increased participation in the sport - whatever the actual percen-
taqe may be.
The statistical ambiguities of diving participation is particularly
evident in the area of the nUllber of divers who are certified annually.
According to a Sea Grant Diving Safe~y Research Project, the number of
14
students taught in 1975 that were certified was 253,104. However, this
figure may be misleading for several reasons. First the data does not
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differentiate between divers receiving basic certification and those who are
receiving advanced certification. Secondly, the study has no way of dis-
cerning the number of students that at the end of their course received cer-
tification from more than one agency. Multiple certifications occur when
a scuba instructor is certified by more than one training agency and he or
she in turn certifies their students with more than one agency. Multiple
certifications are generally regarded within the training industry as some-
what of an anathema. They result to a large degree due to the competitive
aspects involved between:the various agencies. The expressed fear was that
certain "cards were no longer acceptable everywhere by everyone."lS The
result was that instructorsl in order to give maximUDl benefits to their
students, issued several cards. There is no accurate manner to tally the
number of divers who receive JOOre than one "COl card. This problem is symp-
tomatic of the inability of the training agencies to achieve;complete'coop-
eration, the HSTC not withstanding. In the interim, the agencies will con-
tinue to "waste time, money, and effort issuing multiple cards ,,16 until
each agency adopts a universal recognition policy.
An article in HAUl News entitled, "Some ~eFacts on Scuba Diving"
states "from 1970 to 1973 a total of 685,928 divers were certified.,,17
On an annual average for those four years, 171,482 were certified. Taking
into account that diver participation has increased since 1973, a conserva-
tive estimate would be that between 175,000 - 200,000 divers are certified
annually in the U.S. Granted, these parameters are rather large but given
the lack of a central statistical source for diver certification and the pre-
viously discussed problem of multiple certification, any figure is subject
to a certain aJM)unt of justifiable speculation.
The diver certification agencies adamantly maintain that sport diving
is safe and is becoming safer. The agencies quote "statistics as kept by
-9-
the National Safety Council that provide documented proof that verifies
this position ... 1I1S The agencies also freely quote their own statistics.
Two examples:
The number of divers certified per year has doubled
in four years while the accident rate has increased only
5\, causinq a decrease in the fatality rate. This is a
reaarkable safety record, but even more impressive is
that the nWllber of open water exposures per diver during
training has also doubled during' this period. In addi-
tion there is a 20\ dropout rate during diving classes,
so the nu.ber of persons exposed to SOIl8 scuba training
is 20\ higher thanethe number certified.
The same article continues:
From 1970 to 1973 a total of 685,928 divers were
certified. Not even allowing' for class dropouts and
using an averag'e of three open water exposures, this
is 2,057,784 traininq dives. During' this period 462
scuba diver, died but on searching all possible reports
and records only 46 of these deaths were during' instruc-
tion. This is a fatality rate of 0.00002 per dive. 19
These 8tatis~ics, with the excep~ion,of the actual fatalities, (this
paper shows 45 fatalities while in gaining for the corresponding' period)
are subject to so.. questioning. The main point overlooked is that of the
685,928 certified how many received certification from more than one agency.
If this is the case (and most authorities agree that it does exist and so
far has proven to be AI'l ~asurable statistic) than the total nUlllber of
training dive. would be IB\lch lower due to double counting. How much lower
is another unanawerable question. ~U8,the fatality rate would in reality
be somewhat higher than the figure of 0 ..00002.
statistical analysis of diving safety is a subjective field due to the
dearth of unquestionably accurate data. What is aqreec;i however, is that div-
ing is a safer sport than it was ten years ago and the training agencies pre-
dict that diving will become an even safer sport as the major certification
agencies develop new and comprehensive training standards for divers and
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formal training situation. Another 29 (3\) fatalities occurred while div-
ers were being tauqht - usually by a friend - in an informal situation.
These statistics are not included in this study.
Table 2-1 indicates that the highest number of training fatalities
occurred during 1974 and 1975 when training deaths accounted for 12 and
17\ relpectively of the total recreational scuba fatalities. These two
years also reflected an increase in the number of overall recreational
I
scuba fatalities which coincided with an increase in the participatory
level of the sport. Female fatali~ies comprised an averaqe of 13\ of the
training fatalities over the seven year period analyzed. The largest nwnber
of female fatalities occurred in 1972, 1974 and 1975 when 15, 23 and 14 per
cent resPectively of the fatalities were female.
Instructor deaths comprised 4\ of the total training fatalities. It
is difficult to make any constructive analysis of the instructor fatali-
ties due to the unexplained circumstances surrounding the deaths. For in-
stance, one case involved a 24 year old female assistant instructor who
was in the water just beyond the surf line instructing a group of students.
The victim then encountered unknown 4~fficulties and sank to the bottom in
20 feet of water. She was found shortly thereafter with her regulator out
of her mouth. In a case such as this it is inpossible from the available
data to ascertain what actually caused this fat.tlity. Another somewhat
mysterious death occurred to a 48 year old male also acting as an assistant
instructor. The victim was highly qualified,as he was a former U. S. Navy
diver, who regularly dove every two weeks. The victim was in the process
of conducting a demonstration for the students. He swam out 25 yards, dove
down in 12 feet of water and then popped up and waved to the students. The
students then observed the victim splash and qo underneath the water "in a
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peculiar manner." They swam out and recovered the victim. A medical ex-
aminer ruled drowning as the cause of death. What actually precipitated
the strange behavior of this experienced diver was not determined.
One instructor fatality was an apparent case of "bad air" - the only
instance of such a death in all the 97 fatalities. The victim was swimming
with his qroup and signalled that he was surfacing. Upon reaching the sur-
face the victim was seen swimming in erratic circles and soom stopped breath-
ing. A crime laboratory report noted 25.8\ carboxyhemoglobin or carbon mon-
oxide saturation based on total hemoglobin concentration. Unconsciousness
occurs at approximately 30\ carboxyhemoglobin with death at 70%. Although
the relation between CO and depth is still disputed, some scientists main-
tain that CO of a given concentration becomes more toxic as depth increases. 2l
Training fatalities showed a marked decline in 1976 which is especially
encouraging in light of the continued increase in diver certifications.
Whether or not this augers well for the instructional CODD'Runity remains to
be seen. The decrease in the training fatalities may be only a fluctuation
due to the small size of the statistical sample and it is too early to
predict any trends. However, if the number of instructional fatalities as
a percentage of total recreational scuba fatalities continues to show a
decline or remain constant while scuba certifications continue to increase
it would indicate that the training agencies are succeeding in their attempt
to make diving instruction a safer experience.
Table 2-2 is a breakdown of training fatalities by year and month.
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----- Table 2-2
Fatality Distribution by Month and Year
----------------------------------Per Cent----------------------------------------------
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 *
January 0 0 0 0 6 0 8 5
February 10 0 0 8 0 9 0 4
March 10 0 23 0 12 18 23 8
April. 0 0 7 17 12 18 14 9
May 0 60 8 8 17 4 23 12
June 20 0 8 25 12 9 8 9
July 0 0 8 8 5 4 8 14
August 20 10 8 8 12 14 8 12
September 0 0 0 18 0 14 8 9
October 20 20 7 0 6 10 0 6
November 10 0 0 8 12 0 0 6
December 10 10 31 0 6 0 0 6
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Average monthly distribution on an annual basis 1970-1976
for total non-protessiona1 scuba fatalities.
By calendar quarters the first quarter of the year is responsible for
18' of the fatalities, the second quarter 39', the third quarter 22' and the
fourth quarter 21\. With the exception of the second quarter, the fatali-
ties are distributed on a relatively equal basis.
It is interesting to examine the fatalities which occurred from March
to June. These four months accounted for 51 fatalities (53'). Of these
51 fatalities, 73' of them occurred in water which was considered cold -
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a temperature below 55 degrees fak renheit.
One case which illustrates the added physiological and psychological
stresses placed upon the novice diver in cold water involved an 18 year old
college student from a northern midwestern state. The lakes in the student's
home state were still frozen in early March so in order to receive open
water experience prior to certification it was necessary for the class to
travel south to Missouri. The water temperature in the lake where the class
dove was 48 degrees. The victim and his partner made a dive to 50 feet where
the victim experienced difficulties with his air supply. The victim's bud-
dy offered the victim his regulator in an attempt to initiate buddy breath-
ing. Buddy breathing is the sharing of a diver's air supply with his buddy
by alternating breathing from one regulator. At this point the victim pan-
iced and pushed the buddy away. The buddy then surfaced to seek help. A
subsequent search for the victim failed to locate the body. This case il-
lustrates a series of events which frequently occur in cold water fatali-
ties. The novice diver is cold and his already abnormally high respiration
rate is increased even more by the temperature of the water. 22 A dangerous-
ly high stress level is reached due to both the physiological and psychologi-
cal strains placed upon the diver by the combination of inexperience and
cold water. The novice diver is then confronted with an abnormal situation
such as an equipDant failure, perceived or actual, and instead of being able
to assimilate the emergency procedures he has been taught in the pool and the
classroom and extricate himself safely from the situation, the diver panics
which often leads to his death.
Another cold water fatality which points out how the novice diver's judge-
ment is affected by the abnormal stress level occurred when the water temp-
erature was 36 degrees and it was snowing. The victim was a 29 year old male
-15-
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on his second open water dive. The victim was wearing a 1/4 inch neoprene
wetsuit while the rest of the class was usinq the more appropriate 3/8
inch thickness. The victim was somewhat overweighted as he was wearing
34 pounds of weight on his weight belt. The victim and his buddy were
proceeding underwater at a depth of 35 feet when they became separated.
The victim, following accepted diving procedure, surfaced in order to 10-
cate his partner. Unable to see his buddy, the victim swam over to a pier
piling and was soon conversing with several other students who had also sur-
faced. The victim appeared to be in satisfactory condition and the other
students left in order to complete their dive. Upon completion of the class
dive, it was discovered that the victim was _**il\9. His body was recovered
one bourJ,ater, fifteen feet t~JIt~tP~ p~111VJ,~ ,~ victim's ta.nk was empty
and his flotation device had nQt been activ-a~. It. appeared that the vic-
tim hadm,.de an at,t;.4tap; to release h~ "e.1,q~t belt ~ only one inchQf~j:;)­
inq r8lll&1nedbeyond the we;lqht .b.1t ~\JCkle.
What haJ?P~.,d to the victim i.n .thi8,CM~jApd,hpw did the cold water
aggravate the'v.tuation7 ,The IlIOst.p~usiblct ~~~uon~ that the victim
, .,~... - ,
ran out of ai~ ;01).~ s'urface af~~~a..~ng hisl\uerve air supply.
Then the vic~ b~AA tqsink d~ ~¥. ,ov~eighted condition. At this
point the victim apparently tried to 'release his weight belt but failed in
the attempt. Had the victim been able to calaly assess the situation he
would most likely have inflated his flotation device and waited for help.
But the victim was fatiqued and under a hlqh level of stress which when com-
". t 1, .-
bined and aggravated by the severe environmental conditions made it difficult
, ..
for this diver to react in a manner which would have saved his life.
When compared to the total recreational fataliti~s for the corresponding
years, the training fatalities are siqnificantly higher, 53\ vs. 38\, for
~.~ ,- t ,
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decided to go ahead and checkout their new regulators. The male victim was
heard stating that he was going to stay down until he ran out of air in
order to get a real test of his regulator. The victims proceeded to dive
to 70 feet and failed to surface. The instructor commenced a search as soon
as he learned that the divers had entered the water without his permission.
The bodies could not be located that day as the search was hampered by low
visibility. When the victims were located two days later the female was
found with her mask off which could indicate that she may have had her mask
kicked off by her partner in the murky water which resulted in a panic sit-
uation that ultimately claimed the lives of both divers.
There are two hazardous environmental factors which are common to all
of the multiple fatality cases. The first is that all the dives took place
in cold water. The additional stress this places on inexperienced divers
has already been discussed. The second factor common to these cases is that
all the dives were to a depth in. excess of the depth limit established for
basic scuba courses.
There is no reason for an instructor to place his or her students in
a training environment that exposes the student to unnecessary hazards.
It is extremely difficult for novice divers to react successfully to e-
i~
mergency situations when they are under excessive stresses. This~borne out
by the cases where both of the buddy breathing attempts resulted in multiple
fatalities. Emergency ascents from excessive depths are even riskier.
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The distribution of training fatalities by state is given in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4
Training Fatalities by State and Foreign Area
Location 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Alabama 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 2 0 1 0
Arkansas 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
California 5 0 3 3 3 4 3
Colorado 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Florida 0 0 0 1 1 2 1
Georgia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Hawaii 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Illinois 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Indiana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Louisiana 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Maine 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Maryland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mass. 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Missouri 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
New York 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
Rhode Island 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Texas 0 1 2 0 0 2 0
Utah 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
Virginia 0 1 0 0 3 1 1
Washington 0 2 2 2 2 1 2
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Foreign Area
Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Bermuda 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Okinawa 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13
The leading state for traininq fatalities is California with 22\ of
the total. This is not surprisinq as California has a long coastline and
--...
is a prime market for the 'recreational industry. California's percentaqe of
traininq fatalities is almost identical, 22\ vs. 21\, to the percentage of
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total recreational fatalities which occurred in the state. The second
leading state is Washington which had 11\ of the training fatalities.
This is a somewhat larger percentage than the 7% total of recreational
fatalities for the corresponding period. The one state that shows a marked
decrease in training fatalities versus total recreational fatalities is
Florida. Florida had only 4\ of the training fatalities while the state
had 24\ of the total recreational deaths for the same period, IOOre than any
other state. This anomaly is possibly explainable for several reasons.
First a high percentage of Florida's total recreational fatalities, 40\,
1 f d " 24 "are the resu t 0 cave 1v1ng. Although cave div1ng is espec1ally fatal
to novice divers these divers are participating in cave diving outside any
formal training situation. Secondly a significant percentage of Florida's
remaining deaths occur to divers who are certified and are diving in Florida
on wacation.
Although not included in the training fatality statistics, one case
which involved a 17 year old male who had received his certification minutes
prior to his death, illustrates the appeals and dangers of cave diving in
addition to displaying poor decisions on the part of the student's instructor.
The victim was in a class with over 40 other students who had traveled all
night to a spring fed fresh water pool with several caves leading from it.
The instructor had never been to the dive site and had to rendezvous with
another group to find the pool. The students completed their final check-
outs and were given their "c" cards and the instructor cautioned the newly
certified divers not to go into the caves. After warning his students the
instructor left the area to refill expended air tanks. The victim dove with
two other novice divers and the group followed a IOOre experienced set of
divers into a cave. The group, which now consisted of five divers, swam into
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the cave in order to view a small statue that had been placed in a small
chamber. The cave was frequently used and had a safety line strung on the
roof to aid disoriented divers. After the group circled the statue the
victim apparently became disoriented in the low visibility and began swim-
ming in an opposite direction from the group. Upon surfacing, the members
of the group asked if anyone had seen the victim and they received a nega-
tive reply. The instructor when notified ordered a search of the cave and
the victim's body was soon located. Inspection of the victim's tank revealed
that the boy had 600 pounds of air remaining or approximately 7 minutes
of air left at the depth at which he was diving. What most likely happen-
ed was that the victim realized that he was disoriented-- inexperience pre-
vented use of the safety line - and paniced at which point he most likely spit
out his regulator even though he had sufficient air to reach the surface.
Not only does this case show the sometimes fatal attraction cave diving has
for novice divers but it also points some regrettable decisions on the part
of the instructor. Furthermore, this case points out the necessity for
diving instructors to insure that they maintain positive control of their
classes at all times.
An interesting statistic can be obtained by determining what percent-
age of a state's total recreational scuba deaths occurred in a training
situation. In this category Virginia has the highest percentage as 86\ of
the state's recreational fatalities were to student divers in a formal
training status. The other states with high percentages in this category
are: Colorado - 75\, Idaho and Nevada - 50\ and Utah - 43\. The obvious
correlation that is apparent when analyzing these cases is that with the
exception of the Alaskan deaths all the fatalities occurred in fresh water
and that with the exception of three of all the fatalities for these states
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they all were cold water dives. These states, with the exception of
Virginia, are not particularly active scuba diving regions. The result is
that in these type regions it appears that a higher percentage of recrea-
tional fatalities will be to inexperienced divers who are in an aggrava-
ted stress situation.
Of the training fatalities involving u.s. citizens in foreign coun-
tries, half of the fatalities were to off duty U.S. military personnel.
Part III
Victim Profiles
Data collected from the case files of the training fatalities has
permitted the analysis of various personal characteristics of the divers





Age Distribution of Training Victims
Years 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 *
o -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10-15 1 2 (1) 0 2 1 0 0 21(3)
16-20 2 3 2 1 2 6(1) 2(1) 187(15)
21-25 (1) 3 2 (1) 5 5(3) 3(1) 3 236(22)
26-30 0 0 2(1) 2(1) 2 4 3 144 (12)
31-35 2 0 1 0 2(1) 2(1) 0 80(7)
36-40 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 49(2)
41-45 2 2 1 1 3 4 1 65 (4)
46-50 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 39 (4)
51-55 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 27(1)
56-60 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 (1)
60+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·1 8
Age Unknown 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13 888
Note:
*
Figures in parentheses indicate number of female divers in group.
Age Distribution for Total Non-professional Scuba Fatalities
1970-1976.
The highest percentage of fatalities occurred in the 21-25 age bracket.
This group accounted for 23' of the training fatalities. The next highest
group is the 16-20 age bracket which cODFrised 18' of the total. This age
distribution is to be expected. Scuba diving in particular, and outdoor
recreation in general, has a large appeal to the 16-25 year old age level.
That scuba diving is a physically active endeavor also means that it is
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more likely to be attractive to this age group. In addition, opportunities
for scuba instruction are more readily available for this age group. In
order~ meet the demand for an increased interest in outdoor recreation,
an increase in the number and scope of experiential education courses taught
by institutions of higher learning has come about. In the normal college
age level, 18-23, 41' of the 27 fatalities recorded were participating in
a college or university affiliated scuba course. These courses, both ad-
vanced and basic, are taught by instructors who mayor may not be faculty
members of the school in question. The students usually receive academic
credit for the course as well as a certification card from the training
agency with which the parti~u1ar instructor is affiliated. 45' of the
fatalities associated with an institution of higher learning occurred in
the waters of Puget Sound, Washington. This area is associated with cold
water diving but the abundant marine life makes it especially attractive
for scuba divers •. One fatality that occurred to a colleqe student in this
region is typical in that it shows that these courses are usually well con-
ducted with safety conscious supervisory personnel.
The victim was a 22 year old male participating in an underwater life-
saving exercise as part of an advanced scuba course. The drill required the
student to make a free dive wfthout scuba gear in order to recover a simu-
lated scuba victim lying on the bottom in 20 feet of water. A safety diver
and an assistant instructor, both wearing scuba gear, were assigned to monitor
the exercise. The victim dove to the bottom and made contact with the simu-
lated victim. The safety diver observed the contact and surfaced to wait
for the victim and simulated victim to surface. The simulated victim sur-
faced and reported he last saw the victim as he was heading for the sur-
face. "Within 15 seconds" a search was started and the victim's body was
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recovered 20 feet away from the exercise area within two minutes. The vic-
tim was placed in a safetyboat which "as a rule was always stationed within
a 30 yard radius of any open water exercise." Despite extensive lifesaving
efforts including both cardiopulmonary and mouth to mouth resuscitation the
victim failed to respond. Witnesses estimated that the victim could not
have been underwater in excess of 2'1 minutes. Permanent brain damage does
not usually occur unless a victim has been without oxygen in excess of 5
minutes. Thus, the victim was recovered well within the time limit to re-
spond to successful resuscitative efforts. The actions of the training
staff were timely and well coordinated and in most instances would have
prevented a fatality.
Of the 6 cases involving students in the 10-15 year age group, 4 of
these cases showed questionable judgement on the part of the instructors
involved. The other two cases were the result of panic on the part of the
students. One instance of panic resulted in the death of a 13 year old
girl. The victim was on her first open water dive and was with a group of
three other students who were being supervised by two instructors. While
diving the girl lost a fin and paniced, grabbing her partner's mouthpiece
out of his mouth. This resulted in the partner panicing and racing to the
surface from 20 feet. The instructor asked the partner where the girl was
and he replied, "right behind me." The instructor immediately initiated
a search and located the girl's body on the bottom.
The following three cases involved possible questionable judgement by
instructors. The first case involved a 15 year old boy who was making his
first open water dive. The victim was diving with one other student and an
instructor. After they had been diving one hour they all surfaced and pro·
ceeded to the beach. The victim still had some air remaining and he asked
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'----- the instructor if he could go back in the water and dive close to the shore
until his air ran out. The instructor concurred and along with the other
student, monitored the victim's air bubbles from the shore. Soon the vic-
tim's air bubbles stopped and the instructor began searching for the boy.
The instructor searched for several hours in vain and then decided to con-
tact the local authorities. The local police divers located the boy's body
in 30 feet of water. The victim had run out of air but examination of the
tank revealed that the boy had failed to activate his reserve air supply.
This case is a classic example of violation of a primary tenet of scuba
diving - never dive alone. Not only did the instructor condone the boy
diving alone but the boy was highly inexperienced as indicated by his tragic
failure to activate his reserve air supply. Unfortunately, this is not the
only case in which an instructor was standing on the beach while a student
who was diving alone experienced a fatal accident.
Another case is representative of a training situation in which the
instructor conducts a drill which is beyond the ability of the student to
complete in a relatively safe manner. Again the victim was a 15 year old
male. In this instance, the victim was on his fourth open water dive and
was to perform an exercise which consisted of a one mile run followed by
a one mile swim and then the student was to make a "bail-out" dive. A
"bail-out" dive requires the diver to jUDlp off a boat with his tank and
mask in one arm. The diver then descends along with two safety divers to
the bottom, which in this case was 35 feet, and puts his tank and mask on
and then ascends to the surface. As the boy was descending he motioned to
the safety diver that he was not getting any air. The safety diver re-
sponded by giving the boy his mouthpiece and, according to the safety diver,
the boy took two breaths but it appeared that he was' holding his breath.
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At this point the boy paniced and started fighting and kicked the safety
diver in the face causing the safety diver to lose his mask and mouth-
piece requiring an emergency ascent on his part. The safety diver surfaced
bleeding from his nose and ears and yelled at the other divers on the sur-
face who started a search right away. However, it took several hours for
them to locate the boy's body which was found lying face down in the mud,
the boy still clutching his tank and mask. The victim's gear performed
well during a subsequent inspection. This type of an exercise invites a
host of possible dangerous complications. In this case excessive psychologi-
cal stress resulted in the victim making ~he erroneous assumption that
something was wrong with his air supply. Another possible problem could
arise if the participant was unable to equalize during the descent result-
ing in a probable ear squeeze leading to the diver reaching the bottom and
being both disoriented and in intense pain. For an instructor to place a
relatively inexperienced diver in this situation is an invitation to trouble.
Again, this is not an isolated incident. Several other fatalities have oc-
curred during performance of drills not required by the certifying agency
but which instructor's perceive as an effective means of challenging their
students.
The third case resulted in the death of another 15 year old boy. The
dive took place in a man made lake Ln the southwest. The lake was known
to have a very sharp drop off as well as numerous submerged trees which
were difficult to see due to the generally low visibllity of the" lake's
waters. The boy and two other divers requested permission from their in-
structor to make a deep dive to 100 feet. The instructor gave them permis-
sion and-the-three-descendedmaintaining visual contact with the use of hand
held lights. They got down t6l05 feet and began their ascent. Upon reaching
-28-
80 feet the divers encountered a large tree and visual contact was lost with
the victim while the divers were working their way up through the tree. The
two divers surfaced thinking that the boy would be able to work his way up
independently. This was a fallacy, however, as the boy never surfaced and
despite an impressive attempt in the next two weeks to locate the boy his
body was never found. Two important factors contributed to this fatality:
one was the choice of a hazardous dive site that was not at all appropriate
for novice divers; the second was the excessive depth of the dive.
In the middle-age group the need to pick up new leisure time activities
leads to diving as a likely choice. Of the training fatalities, 26\ occur-
red to victims over 40 years of age. Not surprisingly, all were male. The
typical fatality in this group occurred in California (40\) and was the re-
sult of a physical limitation. The most common shortcomings were poor condi-
tioning resulting in asphyxiation by drowning and heart or circulatory
problems (i.e. arteriosclerotic heart disease) which resulted in a coronary
insufficiency or heart attack.
One representative over 40 fatality occurred in Northern California.
The 45 year old victim had completed a basic scuba course four months pre-
viously, but still had not performed his final checkout dive. The victim
was an excellent student in the written portion of the course and according
to his instructor, handled himself .. well .Ln the ocean despite some problems
which had forced cancellation of two open water dives. The victim was
learning to dive alol19' with his wife. On the day of the fatal dive the wife
was also scheduled to dive. She had expressed considerable concern about
her lack of conditioning. She was towed in from her last dive because of
physical exhaustion. Her husband's poor physical shape also concerned her.
At the last minute she declined to participate in the dive worried that she
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would spoil the dive for her husband. There was a moderate 3 foot surf run-
ning and the victim proceeded to enter the water with an assistant instruct-
or and three other divers. All the students experienced some problems with
the surf but it was a particularly arduous exercise for the victim as he had
a reluctance to duck under the waves. This resulted in his being continual-
ly knocked down in the surf zone. After a moderate amount of exertion and a
high amount of anxiety, all the students got outside the surf zone and were
ready to commence their dive when the victim approached the instructor and
said he was tired and would prefer going back into the beach. The instructor
got the attention of a group on the beach, including the victim's wife, by
waving as he accompanied the victim ashore. When the attention of the group
was caught, the instructor, assuming the group would ensure the safe arrival
of his student, proceeded to return to his group of students. The victim
was only several yards offshore but, in the surf zone and being knocked over
repeatedly. The victim's wife entered the water and struggled to help her
husband out of the surf. However, she was not strong enough to support the
weight of her husband. The wife saw that her husband, who by this time had
ingested a good deal of water, was cyanotic with foam corning out of his mouth.
She, therefore, tried mouth to mouth resuscitation but the waves made this
ineffective. At this juncture other members of the group arrived and the
victim was placed above the waterline and an M.D., another student, com-
menced efforts at resuscitating the victim. Again, this effort was inef-
fectual and the victim arrived dead at the hospital.
Though the victim was escorted to a point where he could stand up and
other students were moving down to help the victim the remaining few feet,
the student's poor physical conditioning and high anxiety level should have
been taken into account.
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Table j.~~ lists the primary occupations of the training victims.
Table 3-2
Victim1s Occupational Status
YEARS 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Student 2 4 (1) 3 5 2 (1) 5 (1) 3
Military (Off-Duty) 1 0 1 2 1 2 2
Educational Field 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Medical Field 0 1 4(2) 0 2 (1) 2 1
Engineer 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Clerical 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Misc. (Professional) 0 1 3 0 3 2 0
Misc. (Non-Professional) 0 0 0 0 2 2 0
Unknown 3 (1) 4 1 3(1) 7(2) 7(2) 6 (1)
TOTALS 10 10 13 12 17 22 13
Note: Parentheses indicate number of females in group.
Scuba diving has a high appeal to people in the 16-25 age group which ac-
counts for the fact that 25" of the victim1s occupations that could be ascer-
tained were students. The next highest groups were service personnel and
people employed in the medical profession. These groups each accounted for
9" of the victilllSwith identifiable vocations. From the occupational dis-
tribution it can be seen that diving appears to be a sport primarily parti-
cipated in by whites of the middle and upper middle class. Less than 3%
of the victims were non-white and all of these victims were black.
The appeal diving has to the white collar professions can be most
clearly demonstrated when examining the professions of the training victims
over 40 years of age. Occupational data was available for 15 cases in this
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category. Of the 15 victims, thirteen were in professional occupations
normally associated with an above average in~ome. The two victims that
could be classified as average wage earners were a policeman and a teo1
and die maker. The most common age group in this category was that of
physician.
Part IV
Environmental Aspects of Training Fatalities
The location where the training fatalities occurred is listed in
Table 4-1.
Table 4-1
Location of Training Fatalities
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 *
Ocean, Bay, Sea 7 5 8 9 7 12 10 542
Lake 1 4 4 1 7 6 2 161
Quarry 0 1 0 0 2 2 1 28
River 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 32
Swimming Pool 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Cave 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13 888
* Location for total nonprofessional scuba fatalities
1970-1976.
Sixty percent of the training fatalities occurred in salt water. This
is nearly equal to the total recreational fatalities where 61\ of the total
occurred in salt water. The percentage of training fatalities that occurred
in lakes is somewhat higher, 26\ vs. 16\, than the total recreational fatali-
ti 25es.
When comparing training fatalities that occurred in fresh water to the
total number of recreational fatalities it becomes apparent that fresh water
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diving may be more hazardous to the novice diver than corresponding salt
water dives. 34\ of the training fatalities took place in fresh water as
compared to 25\ of the total recreational deathS, The latter figure does
not include cave diving because in the author's opinion cave diving presents
an entirely unique set of circumstances. Of the training fatalities that
occurred in fresh water, over 2/3 of the cases involved dives made in cold
water. This reinforces the previously discussed adverse effects cold water
has upon a novice diver.
Two fresh water locations in particular have proven to be exceptionally
hazardous to sfludent divers. They are manmade lakes in the midwestern and
Rocky Mountain states, and quarries, most notably in Virginia.
One fatality points out the shortcomings of utilizing such locales for
scuba training. The victim was a 24 year old female who had travelled to the
lake from her home in another mid-westem state. Her diving group had driven
all night to arrive at this particular dive site the next morning. The vic-
tim had complained to a friend that she was suffering from diarrehea as well
as a headache but, upon arrival at the location she took some pain killers
and prepared for her first open water eXPerience. The water temperature was
48 degrees with very low visibility as well. The dive was conducted without
incident and the group proceeded to eat lunch prior to making another dive.
The group, consisting of five students and an instructor, commenced the se-
cond dive holding hands to prevent separation. The plan for the dive was to
proceed to a point where the bottom dropped off sharply and surface prior
to heading back in to shore. The group proceeded to the drop off but, in the
low visibility became confused as to whether it was in fact, time to surface.
At this point the group became separated. The instructor signalled for the
group to surface and inflated one of his student·s flotation vests to aid in
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this effort. However, by this time the rest of the group started going over
the edge of the drop off and encountered a stand of trees which resulted in
the hand hold system falling apart. The group then proceeded rapidly to the
surface and ascertained that they were in fact one diver short. The victim's
buddy was quoted when relating the incident as saying, "we were.holding hands
and there were a lot of trees and logs that we were falling against. I hit
a tree and it knocked me away from her." The victim's body was recovered
several days later by a team of Navy divers who were in the area making an
underwater survey.
The cold and relatively hazardous environment contributed to this fa-
tali ty. Compounding this was the all night bus ride which increased the fa-
tique of the students. The victim was clearly too inexperienced to handle
the emergency. Not only was she in poor health but, she was also over
weighted and was not adequately familiar with her equipment. She still had
air left in her tank when her body was located as she had failed to activate
her reserve. She also had made no attempt to ditch her weight belt which
made her heavier the deeper that she sank. The important aspect of this case
is that at sOllIe point the victim had two or three minutes left to do some-
thing to save herself. She could have ditched her gear and made a free
ascent 30 feet to the surface relying on the buoyancy of her wetsuit. How-
ever, lack of knowledge about her equipment and the high stress factor in-
volved in the environmental conditions prevented the victim from performing
the functions instinctive in a more experienced diver. This is a pattern
repeated in numerous training fatalities. The only solution is for the
instructor to take this into account and make every effort not to put their
students in a compromising position, especially during the first few dives.
Buddy lines might have prevented separation of the students, a buoy line
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to the surface could have been used for each pair of divers. Then, in case
of an emergency, the instructor could have descended down the buoyline and
located a student in difficulty.
The independent factors of this case did not necessarily point to a
hazardous dive, but their combination resulted in a fatal situation. In-
structors must rec~gnize these circumstances and react accordingly with
sound safety precautions.
Another particularily hazardous training environment is that of the
rock quarry. This is evidenced when it is considered that 20\ of all the
quarry fatalities were students in a formal training situation. Training
fatalities, when compared to overall non-professional scuba fatalities are
only 11' of the total. That gives this statistic an even greater impact.
The problem seems to be particularly acute in Virginia. As stated in Table
3-4, Virginia had six training fatalities. This is a state with large bodies
of moderately temperate salt water. Yet, five of these deaths occurred
while students were obtaining open water eXPerience in rock quarries. Only
one of the five deaths was in water above 45 degrees. However, in none of
the fatalities can quarry diving as a diving environment be pinpointed as
the major cause of the accidenCe
One of the cases does point out how the quarry location is neverthe-
less a contributory factor. The victim was a 25 year old male on his second
open water dive at a quarry which in a three month period was the locale for
two training fatalities. The exercise in which the student was participating
consisted of a surface snorkel to a point above a platform which was sus-
pended at a depth of 35 feet. The depth of the water at this point was 85
feet. Once above the platform the student, who was accompanied by an assist-
ant instructor and an observer, was to switch to his scuba tank and descend
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-- to the platform where two instructors would practice buddy breathing and
mask clearing drills. The three divers descended rather slowly as all had
difficulties equalizing the pressure in their ears. Upon reaching the plat-
form the victim performed the exercise well and was transferred back to the
custody of the assistant instructor and the observer who were to accompany
him in a buddy breathing ascent to the surface. The assistant and the vic-
tim swam off the platform and started buddy breathing. At this point, the
observer noted that the pair while concentrating on the buddy breathing were
actually descending. The observer signalled the assistant instructor and he
started kicking in order to begin the actual ascent. By this time the vic-
tim'was having trouble taking the assistant's mouth piece. He began shaking
violently and paniced, struggling to get out of the grasp of the instructor.
The situation worsened as the assistant momentarily blacked out but, fortunate-
ly, managed to retrieve his mouth piece and make it to the surface. Upon
reaching the surface the assistant asked the observer (who had surfaced
earlier due to continued inability to clear her ears) if she had seen the
victim. After receiving a negative reply the assistant dove again without
the observer in an attempt to locate the victim. Meanwhile the two instruct-
ors noticed a small stream of bubbles coming from beneath the platform and
one proceeded to the bottom to search for what he believed was a lost weight
belt. As the instructor was feeling about the mud and silt in two foot vis-
ibility he felt a body. The victim was by now unconscious but, the instruct-
or managed to get the victim to the surface. The victim received brief
treatment at a recompression chamber but, in fact, was probably dead on arrival.
There were various problems in this case that resulted in one and very
nearly a second fatality. The obvious drawback to the suspended platform
was the unanticipated descent by the student and assistant during the buddy
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breathing exercise. Had they been on a firm bottom at this depth this death
may not have occurred. The cold water and low visibility probably heighten-
ed the victim's anxiety which ultimately resulted in a panic situation.
Buddy breathing ascents are a high-risk exercise which in this case, when
combined with the diving environment, proved too much for the student. The
student was apparently overweighted for the depth of this dive. In this case,
this was the primary cause of his death. In addition to this the buddy
system was violated which almost resulted in a multiple fatality.
The six fatalities that occurred in swimmdng poOls were due to a variety
of causes. One student died of an air embolism following a drill in which
each student proceeded along the bottom at a 16 foot depth and breathed
air from six tanks placed along the bottom. The student after breathing from
the fifth tank, surfaced without exhaling and remarked, "1 goofed. 1 for-
got to exhale." He then swam to the pool gutter and collapsed. He died later
at a hospital. Free ascent training is a matter of considerable debate with-
in the training agencies and will be discussed in detail later in this paper.
Another swimming pool death was also the result of a student's failure
to successfully complete an instructor's exercise. In this case, the class
was in the process of going through a simulated night dive during which
the lighting in the pool was turned off. Two other students noticed the
victim, a 50 year old male, lying on the bottom and they offered him their
air but received no response. As the victim's regulator was out of his
moubh, the students ascertained something was wrong and notified their in-
structor. The victim was DOA.
It could be argued that in these cases the exercise had the best of
intentions and was a valuable learning experience for the class, but in
these instances, the student's inadequate performance resulted in their
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deaths. Whether or not the particular exercises were too difficult for
IOOst students is not the question at issue. The problem is that instruct-
ors must know the limitations of their weakest student and adjust their
course curriculum to safely accoIOOdate that student. ~ not do this ob-
viously can lead to a fatality.
Another of the swimming pool fatalities was a direct result of inade-
quate supervision. The victim was practicing with two fellow students, a
husband and wife, without any instructors in the immediate vicinity of the
pool. The wife experienced difficulties and the victim, a 27 year old male,
came to her aid and assisted in removing her from the pool. This was not
an easy task for the victim and required a good deal of exertion on his
part. He looked up at the husband who was preoccupied attending to his wife.
The victim then waved to the couple and promptly sank to the bottom of the
pool. The husband continued to aid his wife but soon noticed the victim
on the bottom and jumped into the pool and brought the victim to the sur-
face. The husband applied IOOuth to"'IOOUth resuscitation but the victim had
already expired.
The other pool deaths were for a variety of reasons, none of which in-
dicated any unusual circumstances.
Table 4-2 gives data on the platform utilized in training fatalities.
Table 4-2
Type of Diving Platform
Platform Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Per Cent
shore 5 9 11 6 12 14 9 65
Boat 2 1 1 5 4 5 4 24
Pool 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 8
Unknown 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13 100
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An analysis of platforms used in training fatalities reveals that
an upward trend has occurred since 1972 in the number of training fatali-
ties that have occurred while a boat was used as the divinq platform. 24\
of the training fatal! ties happened while a boat was the platform. The most
interesting aspect of the boat fatalities is that 70% of the deaths occur-
red while the victims were making dives deeper than 40 feet. Of these cases
that involved dives in excess of 40 feet, four vere documented as advanced
courses. Depth limitations for advanced courses vary from agency to agency.
For example, PADI's maximum depth for advanced courses is 100 feet while
NAUI has a 130 foot limit. The accepted limit for scuba diving is gener-
ally 130 feet, a figure based on the criteria set forth in the u.s. Navy
Diving Manual. Deducting the advanced students from the 70% figure still
leaves a total of 52% of the boat fatalities occurring at depths greater
than the maximum guidelines as established by the training agencies.
Of the fatalities that occurred in depths greater than 40 feet while
a boat was used as the diving platform, nine of these deaths, 60\, would
most likely not have occurred if the dives had taken place at depths within
the established guidelines. ThisLs admittedly a subjective statistic
which is based on case analysis and deductions by the writer, however, a
representative case will illustrate how such a conclusion can be made.
The victim was a 19 year old male who was participating in an advanced
course held at a fresh water lake. The water was cold and visibility very
limited. The dive plan was for each pair of divers to make a bounce dive
to 120 feet. A bounce dive consists of a descent to the desired depth fol-
lowed immediately by an ascent to the surface. The victim was in the second
group of divers. As the pair was making their descent and had arrived at
100 feet the victim's buddy's regulator malfunctioned and buddy breathing
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was initiated. This was done for four exchanges when the buddy paniced and
made an emergency ascent to the surface independently. The buddy was hos-
pitalized and fortunately survived. The victim though was not as lucky
and failed to surface. His body was recovered one month later by a manned
underwater submersible.
Besides reaffirming the difficulty of successfully completing a buddy
breathing ascent, this case is a good example of why not to have students
make deep dives. Had this dive been made to 40 feet and a breakdown in the
buddy breathing occurred, the victim would have a more feasible chance to
make a successful independent swimming ascent. Of the nine cases using boats
as a platform and excessive depth was a factor, two thirds of the cases in-
volved unsuccessful attempts at making buddy breathing ascents.
Analysis of diving platforms used in training fatalities shows a po-
tentially dangerous trend developing. There is definitely an increase in
the use of boats as diving platforms in training fatalities. Furthermore,
training dives using boats appear to be more likely to involve dives to ex-
cessive depths. To the student diver this presents an especially acute
problem should an emergency at depth arise. That two thirds of the attempts
at buddy breathing ascents were unsuccessful is an indication of the sever-
ity of the problem. Instructors need to be more cognizant about the effects
of excessive depths on their student's chances to successfully utilize e-
mergency procedures especially when the tendency exists to make deeper dives
. when using a boat as the diving platform.
Diving to excessive depths is not only a problem when diving from boats.
Table 4-3 lists the depths at which the training fatalities occurred.
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~Table 4-3
Depth of Training Fatality Dives
Depth in Feet Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
o -10 3 0 3 2 3 5 1
10-20 1 1 2 1 2 3 1
20-30 4 1 2 1 2 1 4
30-40 0 1 0 0 3 4 2
40-50 0 0 1 0 2 1 1
50-60 1 2 0 5 2 1 0
60-70 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
70-80 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
80-100 0 2 1 1 1 1 0
100-130 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Depth Unknown 0 0 2 0 1 3 2
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13
--
Thirty six training fatalities occurred at depths greater than the
maximum allowable 40 foot depth for basic scuba courses. Of these thirty
six deaths, six involved students participating in advanced classes. This
still leaves 31% of the training fatalities occurring at depths in excess
of the recommended limits. In 1/3 of the fatalities that involved dives
deeper than 40 feet, unsuccessful attempts at buddy breathing were initia-
ted, another statistic indicating the difficulty novice divers have in com-
pleting this means of emergency ascent. For an instructor to assume that
this means of ascent is a viable option for a student diving deeper than
forty feet is questionable.
A fatality which points out questionable judgement involved both a dive
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to excessive depths and the failure of an attempted buddy breathing ascent.
The victim was a 19 year old male making his fourth open water dive. It
was the intention of the instructor to allow the students to make a dive
to 100 feet. His rationale was, "We always give students a 100 foot dive
since sooner or later they are going to do it anyway." On the day in ques-
tion, the instructor could not attend the open water dive as a representa-
tive from a diving equipment company was visiting his dive shop. In his
place the instructor dispatched a diver who worked for him as an assistant
instructor but lacked certification as an instructor by a national agency
even though he was "personally certified" by the instructor who ran the div-
ing shop. After making the descent to 100 feet the victim and his partnerl
who was a student instructor, began their ascent. At a depth of around 50
feet the victim ran out of air and began buddy breathing. The ascent was
temporarily halted as the student instructor signalled his other students
to ascend to the surface. When the student instructor turned his attention
back to the victim he noticed that the victim had begun drifting back to-
wards the bottom. The student instructor began a descent in order to catch
up with the victim but he too ran out of air before he could catch up with
his student. The student instructor was forced to surface. The victim.under-
standably failed to surface. His body was recovered the next day.
Diving to excessive depth which places the student diver in a compro-
mising situation should he run out of air or have an equipment failure, be
it real or imaginary, has accounted for a significant number of training
fatalities. There is really little value in making deep dives. The skill
involved in descending is minimal. If a diver can equalize his ear pressure
to descend down to 40 feet he can usually make it much deeper with little
additional effort. Once depth is reached there is really very little to do
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due to the radically decreased air supply - at 130 feet a diver would have
approximately one fifth the usable air that he would have near the surface.
Furthermore, anxiety on the part of the student may cause him to overbreathe
his regulator since denser air - caused by the increased ambient pressure -
increases respiratory work. If this is combined with poorly maintained
regulators, the anxiety ridden student, as happened in several cases, im-
agines that he or she is in fact out of air. At this point the novice diver
may panic, making a successful emergency ascent to the surface difficult
at best, even though the student in reality has enough air remaining on the
ascent due to the decrease in ambient pressure to get a few breaths out of
their tank. 26 To mmke a safe emergency ascent the diver must possess the
utmost in skill, calmness, and coordination - attributes which are greatly
inhibited by excessive depth. In a recreational training environment there
is no need to have novice divers make deep dives. Water less than 40 feet
can present enough challenges for a diver to acquire sufficient experience
and skill in diving. For instructors to take basic students to greater
depths presents significant problems as evidenced by the fact that 37\
of the training deaths occurred while students were diving deeper than 40 feet.
Part V
causes of Recreational Training Fatalities
The proximate causes of training fatalities are listed in Table 5-1.
The intent of this particular table is not to present undisputable statis-
tical data. An analysis of this sort inevitably requires some subjectivity.
The proximate startinq causes are sometimes difficult to ascertain for vari-
ous reasons such as limited data available to make a completely objective
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opinion based solely on the facts available. In many cases the startinq
cause of an accident may in fact be one of several causitive factors that
ultimately resulted in the victim's demise.
An example of a case involving several causitive factors involved a
29 year old male who had been "out on the town" the night before and got
only four hours sleep prior to his dive. In addition, the man was taking
quaaludes "for gall bladder trouble." The inst.ructor noted that the victim
was acting "funny" and had the student go into the water without tanks to see
if he would become alert enough to dive. The instructor then decided that
the victim was alert enough and the class proceeded with the dive. In the
course of the dive the victim became separated from his buddy and ended up
tangled in a kelp bed and eventually ran out of air and drowned. Which
factor resulted in the victim's death? Was it the victim's physical state,
or the fact that be became tangled in the kelp? Or was it the fact that
he ran out of air? Each choice has some validity but in this case the vic-
tim's poor physical condition due to the alcohol and drugs was selected as
the starting cause, the only fatality in this study in which drugs or al-
cohol were a factor. The i1llportance of Table 5-1 therefore, lies not in
the precise statistical data of the table, but rather the ability to identi-
fy the major causitive factors which lead to training fatalities.
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-- Table 5-1
Proximate Starting Cause of Fatalities
CAUSES 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 TOTAL PerCent
MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
OVerall fatigue 2 0 4 1 2 3 1 13 13
Excessive stress (Panic) 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 10 10
Heart Failure 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 6 6
Miscellaneous 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 6 6
subtotal 35 35
BUDDY SYSTEM FAILURE
Separated or Diving alone 0 0 1 0 5 4 1 11 11
RUNNING OUT OF AIR
No air situation 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 12 12
ASCENT DIFFICULTIES
Emergency ascent training,
Buddy breathing failure, 1 8 1 2 2 2 2 18 18
Emergency ascent
DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT
High surf, cold water,
low visibility 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 4 4
Kelp entanglement 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2





with diving gear 0 1 0 2 0 2 2 7 7
UNDETERMINED 2 1 1 3 0 4 1 12 12
TOTALS 10 10 13 12 17 22 13 97 100
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The most prevalent causitive factor was the medical and psychologi-
cal category which accounted for 35 cases (36\). Within this category
most of the deaths were the result of fatigue, usually involving divers over
35 years of age. A typical case of this type involved a 45 year old male who
had surfaced following a dive and was proceeding to his dive mat with his
buddy. On the swim back to the mats they encountered a series of three
kelp beds which required considerable exertion on the part of the victim to
cross. The victim finally managed to reach his mat but was unable to pull
himself out of the water due to his fatigued state and the fact that he had
swallowed considerable water while crossing the kelp beds. At this point,
the victim's buddy decided to tow him in to shore and proceeded in towards
the beach. But by the time they got in the victim had aspirated his sto-
mach contents and resuscitative efforts were to no avail.
Many of the fatigue fatalities would not have occurred had the vic-
tims saved sufficient air for the surface. Breathing from a regulator in-
stead of a snorkel on the swim in to the beach is much easier and more re-
laxing for a fatigued diver. In other cases involving kelp entanglement
on the surface and relatively high surf at the surf line, major problems
for a fatigued novice diver would have been alleviated had the diver still
had air remaining in his or her tank.
As noted in the table, 6 fatalities were diagnosed as heart attacks.
Physical exams are not required, but are strongly recommended for people
over 40, for participation in a scuba course. Several of the heart attack
victims had had physicals prior to their death and had received the go a-
head from their physicians to dive. Requiring physicals for divers over
40 will not be a universal panacea but it definitely could reduce some fa-




One of the primary tenets of scuba diving involves the theory that
divers should never dive alone. The use of a partner or "buddy" when diving
enables a dive team to increase their chances of successfully responding
to an emergency situation. "Never dive alone" is probably the most oft
repeated phrase encountered in a scuba course. However, as Table 5-2
shows, diving alone is not the biggest problem but rather, the problem is
that divers lose track of each other during the course of a dive and when
an emergency situation arises they are unable to help each other.
In only 25 of the 97 training fatalities did the victim actually stay
with his buddy. Subtracting the six deaths that were multiple fatalities,
there were only 19 cases (20\) in which the buddy system was in use and the
system did not break down. In 54 cases (56\) the divers were either volun-
tarily or involuntarily separated. If a buddy were close by in many of
these cases the fatalities may not have occurred.
The reasons for buddies becoming separated are numerous as an examina-
tion of several cases illustrates. One case concerned a 23 year old male
who was on a training dive with his class which included his girlfriend.
During the class dive the victim's girlfriend ran out of air and commenced
buddy breathing wi th the victim. For an unknown reason this did not work out
and she started buddy breathing with another student. According to the girl-
friend, the victim then "got mad" and swam away alone. He was .not; seen a-
live again. His body was recovered the next day with 500 psi of air re-
maining. What happened after the separation that resulted in the victim's
death is a matter of speculation as is the question of why the victim got
mad enough to swim off by himself.
Another case involved a 37 year old male enrolled in an advanced course.
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He reportedly was a veteran of over 800 dives. According to class members
the victim voiced his desire to look for scallops before they commenced
their dive. During the dive the victim left the group, presumably to look
for scallops, and was not seen again. His body was never recovered.
The high percentage of training fatalities that occurred following
the separation of buddies indicates the need to ensure that all students
are taught the skills and importance of maintaining contact with their
buddy in the course of a dive. Another oft repeated diving axiom is that
diving alone does not kill divers, but being alone when something goes
wrong does. The statistics in Table 5-2 bear out the sagacity of that par-
ticul.ar saying.
Running out of air or being in a situation in which the student thought
he or she was running out of air was identified as the starting cause in 12
cases. However, there were 17 cases (18\) identified in which the student
believed that they ran out of air. The latter number is larger as certain
cases which resulted in an out of air situation were the result of another
starting cause, i.e. a student becomes tangled in kelp and runs out of air.
Table 5-3 lists the actions taken by students who perceived themselves to be
in an "out of air" situation.
Table 5-3
Action Taken When "Out of Air"
Action Taken
Victim failed to surface-Found Later
Ran out of Air on Surface-Drowned
Attempted Buddy Breathing-Ascent to Surface









Several observations on this table are important. First, only one fa-
tality involved an attempted emergency independent ascent to the surface.
When actually out of air this is a recommended means of making an emergency
ascent. 27 The low number of fatalities involving independent ascents
would seem to validate the selection of this means of emergency ascent as
the recommended choice. Another noteworthy item is that in 23' of these
cases the victim had sufficient air remaining had he or she successfully
aetivated their reserve air supply. In most of these cases a student is
at the end of a dive and is usually cold and breathing rapidly when it sud-
denly becomes very difficult to get a breath. In this situation the novice
diver displays the tendency to panic and instead of calmly turning on the
reserve they either fail to correctly activate their reserve air, or attempt
some form of emergency ascent to the surface. This is unfortunate because
as previously discussed, the decrease in ambient pressure can result in a
few breaths of air being available to the student should they have the pre-
sence of mind to realize it.
That five fatalities in the "out of air" category occurred to divers
on the surface again indicates the need to emphasize that as good diving
practice, students should save sufficient air (300 - 600 psi) for the
surface.
Ascent difficulties were the starting cause for ten fatalities.
Of these ten fatalities seven occurred while the students were partici-
pating in emergency ascent drills. Table 5-4 gives a breakdown of these
fatalities on a year by year basis. A typical case in this category was
one in which a 21 year old male was on his second dive in open water and
the class was conducting independent emergency ascent training from 25
feet. The procedure was that the instructor would grab a hold of each
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student and give the signal to start the ascent. The instructor would hold
on to the student through the ascent and, upon reaching the surface, the
instructor would critique the student. In this instance, the instructor
and victim made their ascent and upon reaching the surface the instructor
asked the victim if he was all right. The victim replied, "I'm fine."
The instructor was just about to tell the victim how well he had done when
the victim threw his head back, made a "strange gurgling noise" and started
to sink. The student was evacuated by helicopter but died in a hospital from
an air embolism.
Emergency ascent training is pe~ps the most hotly debated issue in
recreational scuba training today. The primary danger being that it ex-
poses students to the danger of an air embolism, a condition which is fre-
quently fatal. Air embolisms occur when the tiny air sacs in the lungs,
called alveoli, rupture which allows air to escape. Rupture of the alveo-
Ii may admit air bubbles into the lung capillaries~ from there they enter
the heart and are pumped out through the aorta. These air emboli can ob-
struct blood flow in the brain and/or coronary arteries. Air embolisms are
often fatal because effective treatment requires prompt recompression which
may not be readily available. 28
For years all major training agencies required open water emergency
ascent training prior to basic certification. However, in 1976 the YMCA
broke with tradition and prohibited its instructors from conducting actual
29
continuous exhalation ascents from depths greater than 12 feet. The
situation was clarified somewhat by the National Scuba Training Committee
(formerly the National Scuba Training Council - but still the NSTC) which
met soon after it appeared that a serious problem existed as to the futuve~
viability of emergency ascent training. Briefly, there were two schools of
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thought on emergency ascent training. One school felt that due to the fa-
talities that had occurred while emergency ascent training was being con-
ducted the students should not be exposed to the hazards of a potential air
embolism and the drills should be simulated. In this case students would
perform simulated ascents while actually swimming horizontally. The counter
argument was that running out of air or a similar equipment failure was a
real possibility when scuba diving and students should be proficient in
the ability to perform emergency ascents in order that they can successfully
handle such an emergency.
The NSTC policy statement actually skirts the basic question of how
to conduct emergency ascent training. The policy statement defines the
emergency options available to a diver with an apparent termination of air
supply at depth. These options consist of the use of an extra second stage
regulator (octopus), buddy breathing ascent, emergency swimming ascent, or
buoy any ascent. The statement says that it is the responsibility of each
agency to train divers to select the appropriate option for the situation
d t · th d" to b abl f f . h . 30an to ra1n e 1ver e cap e 0 per orm1ng t e opt1ons. The
policy statement does not specify how the training is to be conducted.
Ascent training remains a problem area. Buddy breathing is recogniz-
ed to be a very hazardous method of emergency ascent. According to NAUI it
is the least desirable method of making an emergency ascent. 3l Thirteen
such fatalities involving student in a training situation occurred. Table
5-5 lists the problems encountered during these ascents.
That only one of the 13 fatalities occurred while an octopus rig was
being used indicates the desirability of the use of an additional second
stage. Some training agencies strongly recommend that their instructors
be equipped with an octopus. The major training agencies concur that the
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preferred method of emergency ascent is the independent swimming ascent.
Data from tables 5-4 and 5-5 confirm the difficulty involved in teach-
ing students the requisite skills necessary to perform successful emerqency
ascents. The recent concern over ascent training has resulted in workshops
on the subject, such as one held in November of 1977 sponsored by the Undersea
Medical Society. The one issue that all concerned appear to agree upon is
that more research must be done prior to any concrete solution. In the inter-
im the training agencies will refine and tighten the procedures utilized
in conducting emergency ascent training arguing that, "the benefits of the












However, due to the high skill factor involved in learning emergency
ascent skills and the unique dangers presented by the changing ambient pres-
sure, it is likely that fatalities while conducting emergency ascent train-
ing will continue. A possible alternative, not teaching emergency ascent
training skills, could lead to an even greater loss of life as divers are
certified without the most rudimentary ability to confront emergencies
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Table 5-5
Problems During Buddy Breathing Ascents
CASE
Attempt aborted, changed to swimming ascent
Victim paniced and refused air
Victim unable to breathe and subsequent panic
Double fa tali ty
Donor out of air













Of these deaths, there were only
Most of these cases in this cate-
Dangerous environmental conditions accounted for 11 cases (11\) of
the fatalities. The most important factor is the tendency to make dives
to an excessive depth which is been discussed preViously. The one thing
that instructors need to be JOOre aware of is that even though such environ-
mental conditions such as 3 foot surf may not seem dangerous to them, it
can cause enough apprehension on the part of a student to result in a fatality.
Equipment failures were a relatively minor cause for training fatali-
ties resulting in only 7\ of the deaths.
two documented cases of regulator failure.
gory were from the victim being overweighted which frequently caused the vic-
tim to panic in the face of adversity.
Autopsies were conducted in 64\ of the fatalities. The results are doc-
umented in Table 5-6. When comparing Table 5-6 with the corresponding total
recreational fatalities, the major difference is that lung overpressure is '
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~the primary complaint more often in training fatalities, 26\ vs. 18\.33
Table 5-6
Results of Autopsies
PRIMARY COMPLAINT 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 TOTAL
Asphyxiation or drowning 3 1 8 3 5 8 6 34
Lung overpressure - Air
embolism or pneumothorax 2 2 1 3 2 4 2 16
Heart failure 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 6
Aspiration of
stomach contents 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
Bilateral ear rupture 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Intestinal disorder 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Gas contamination
(CO poisoning) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Autopsy not conducted/
Body never recovered 3 6 2 5 6 9 4 35
Totals 10 10 13 12 17 22 13 97
Part VI
conclusions and Recommendations
Recreational diving instruction has been riding a boom for the last ten
years. During this time there has been a rapid expansion in the number of
new divers certified by the major national training agencies. And there
also has been no regulation of the training community by any federal or
state regulatory agency.
All attempts at diver training regulation have been at the local level
of government, such as the Los Angeles county Scuba Ordinance which went in-
to effect on October 15, 1974. While the commercial diving industry came
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under strict regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA), which established mandatory guidelines effective October 20,
1977, the training of recreational scuba divers managed to be one of the
three exemptions to the OSHA diving standards. 34 Lack of government regu-
lation might lead one to believe that the training agencies are doing their
job well and any attempts at regulation would be classified as more "need-
less government interference." This paper has shown people do indeed die
while learning to scuba dive and a significant portion of these deaths could
be prevented. The issue is whether or not outside regulation of the indus-
try would be able to prevent these fatalities. It is the opinion of the
author that strict federal guidelines regulating scuba course minimum re-
quirements and standards for instructors would eliminate a portion of the
training deaths. However, a preferable solution - at least to the train-
ing agencies - exists. Namely, concrete measures that can be mutually
agreed upon standards, taken by the training agencies which would result in
well trained divers taught by competent, professional instructors.
In the last ten years many divers have been certified by the national
agencies but a smaller n\1lN:)er of these divers actively engage in the sport
following certification. Various estimates are available that indicate
that anywhere from 45 to 90 percent of all certified divers stop actively
diving within one. year of completion of their basic scuba class. 35 For
the training agencies to continue to train a high number of divers, they
eventually must attempt to encourage inactive divers to take more advanced
courses. Only 5\ of certified divers currently take any kind of an ad-
vanced course. 36 The reason for the lack of sustained interest in scuba
diving by students is that divers are inadequately trained. The vast ma-
jority of scuba students receive only three open water experiences, only
-56-
two of which involve the use of scuba gear. It is impossible to teach a
person to be a proficient diver, void of the normal fear and anxiety as-
sociated with venturing into a foreign environment, in such a limited time
frame. The training agencies recognize this and universally encourage more
open water dives for students. They offer advanced designations such as
"Open Water Diver" to students in the hope that they will obtain the neces-
sary skill levels and exposure to open water that will enable them to feel
completely familiar with their equipment and in control of their experience
underwater. These are skills that all scuba divers should have before they
receive certification and are able to dive independently.
Training agencies are in the process of changing their curriculums.
PADI now promotes "an ultramodern, nontradi tional way to teach diving." In
the interests of a more realistic experience, "all water work for the course
should be conducted in open water, under fawrable conditions." But the new
course still only requires three open water training dives, although the pre-
ferred Open Water Scuba Diver, which includes five open water dives, course
37
may be taught. The new course that requires five open water dives is an
improvement but eliminating pool training may increase the apprehension the
student is likely to experience in his first dives. A better approach
might be to require five open water dives in addition to pool training.
As the study of training fatalities has shown, students need all the time
they can possibly get, be it in a pool, ocean or classroom.
Understandably, one training agency is reluctant to require a basic
course that consists of more open water diving than the other training a-
gencies. Diver training is a competitive industry not without certain fi-
nancial considerations. The potential student represents a capital gain to
both the instructor and frequently the dive shop with which the instructor
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affiliates.
In addition to more open water training, the training agencies need to
place more emphasis on having their students acquire the practical open
water skills that they will need to feel comfortable and confident underwater.
The training fatality statistics indicate that frequently students are unable
to handle emergencies underwater. Students are often unable to handle out
of air situations, staying together with their buddy during the course of a
dive, properly using their equipment. These are rudimentary skills which
students must have the ability to utilize if they are to be competent divers.
Conscientious and knowledgable instructors are necessary if the train-
ing agencies are to reduoe training fatalities. It is in the instructor's
own best interests to practice what he teaches. Legal precedents have been
established that dictate that:
A scuba instructor may be held liable for negli-
gence in failing to exercise the ordinary skill of
his profession which results in the instruction and
supervision of students in learning scuba diving and
for any injuries incident to that instruction. 38
The legal profession since 1971 has found instructors negligent and
considerable judgements have been awarded to the plaintiffs. In fact there
is a shortage of insurance companies willing to write liability coverage
for the training industry which was very close to not securing insurance cov-
erage in 1977. 39
Instructors need to know when not to make training dives. This study
has shown that instructors need to pay more attention to adverse environment-
al conditions and the effect these conditions have on the anxiety level of
inexperienced divers. Too many students were unable to cope with the in-
creased demands placed on them by the hazardous locations where they were
diving.
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Instructors also show the need to learn better how to gauge the limi-
tations of their students. It appears that instructors atterrpt to rush
some of their students and have them perform exercises which exceed their
ability level. This has resulted in several deaths.
Certain requirements can be made mandatory by the training agencies
in order to reduce fatalities. A comprehensive physical examination should
be required for students over 35. The physical examination should make an
accurate assessment of the potential student's ability to engage in rela-
tively strenuous periods of exertion.
The training agencies should also investigate the possibility that
changes in scuba courses which are held in cold water are in order. That
the majority of trainees died in cold water, often accompanied by low visi-
bility, indicates the need for more research in this area.
People will continue to die,while learning to scuba dive. The under-
water environment does not provide the opportunity for many mistakes. stu-
dents will always be nervous and liable to make a fatal error.
Government regulation could reduce training fatalities through rigid
criteria imposed upon the training industry. However, the same goal can
be accomplished by self regulation of the training agencies by a strong ad-
visory board such as the NSTC. This body could enforce uniform guidelines
that would permit the "basic" scuba diver to be adequately trained. If
each of the major training agencies would consent to abide by the dictums
of such a body the competitive aspects of training recreational divers
could assume a more positive direction ~ namely train a better diver.
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